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Abstract 
This thesis examines the twenty-first century non-combat activities of China’s armed 
forces as defined in a 2009 official release titled “Building Non-Combat Military 
Operation Ability”1 in order to understand the historical development, domestic drivers 
and broader implications of China’s contemporary non-combat missions. The paper 
focuses primarily on disaster relief and domestic stability maintenance, two types of 
operations that are ideal for examining how the internal drivers of non-combat missions 
are manifested in practice. Both Chinese and Western PLA analysts frequently view non-
combat activities primarily as a component of China’s growing international military 
presence rather than analyzing the domestic scope and causes of these operations. Indeed, 
participation in international non-combat missions allows China’s armed forces to 
achieve unprecedented operational experience outside of China’s immediate periphery 
and has also helped enhance China’s international soft power. This thesis, however, 
demonstrates that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Armed Police (PAP) 
twenty-first century non-combat missions are chiefly designed to achieve domestic goals. 
These include maintaining regime stability, balancing complex civil-military relations, 
and preserving the PLA’s image as an army “serving the people” amid complex internal 
and external national security environments. I argue that an “outward-looking” approach 
focused on the international ramifications of PLA and PAP non-combat operations is 
insufficient to fully understand these missions, and it can potentially distort our view of 
China’s broader military development. As vital conduits for bolstering CCP regime 
stability, Chinese civil-military relations and the PLA’s image as a people-centric force, 
China’s twenty-first century domestic non-combat operations, driven by internal security 
challenges arising from socioeconomic, military and historical developments in post-
reform China, will likely continue to grow in importance and scope as these trends persist 
and intensify, thereby ensuring that the military retains a prominent role in China. As a 
result, twenty-first  century non-combat operations have the potential to impede outward 
Chinese military development rather than simply expand Chinese interests abroad as 
more resources are needed to pursue internal security objectives.  
 
 
  
 
                                                          
1Sun Yanxin[孙彦新], “国防部：军队年底将建成 8支共 5万人应急救援部队” [Guofangbu: Jundui niandi jiang jiancheng 8 zhi 
gong 5 wanren yingji jiuyuan budui] [Ministry of National Defense: Military will establish 8 emergency-response professional units 
with 50,000 troops by the end of year], 新华社 [Xinhuashe] [Xinhua News Agency], April 20, 2010, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-
04/20/content_1587746.htm  
3 
 
Contents 
Introduction                
 
1 Historical Development and Twenty-First Century Scope of China’s Non-Combat 
Operations 
Evolution of Non-Combat Operations and Contemporary Role of “Army for the People”      
 
2 Domestic Drivers of PLA Non-Combat Operations 
Consequences of Economic, Civil-Military and Historical Change                    
 
3 The Military’s Role in Domestic Disaster Relief  
Prioritization of Jiuzai, Roles of the PLA and PAP, and Existing Shortcomings  
 
4 The Military’s Role in Domestic Stability Maintenance   
The Emergence of Weiwen, Roles of the PLA and PAP, and Growing Deficiencies  
      
Concluding Thoughts 
    
             
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Introduction 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), mainland China’s ruling party since 1949, 
celebrated its 90-year history on July 1, 2011. Since its victory over the Chinese 
Nationalist Party (KMT) in 1949, the CCP’s core objectives have included upholding 
CCP legitimacy, maintaining steady economic growth in China, preserving domestic 
stability, defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and aspiring to make 
China a great power. These objectives have remained constant amid perpetually evolving 
national security challenges.
2
 While the CCP’s fundamental interests have not changed, 
the means to securing them have evolved over time, and the structure and functions of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have changed in order to adapt to diverse national 
security challenges stemming from economic development, social change, military 
modernization and shifting international relations. 
In the 21
st
 century, the diversification of PLA operations reflects the growing 
complexity of security developments in and around China. Both Jiang Zemin
3
 and Hu 
Jintao, China’s two paramount leaders in the new millennium, have taken major steps to 
redefine and expand the role of the military in China and internationally in an era where 
China is increasingly confronted with formidable internal and external security.
4
 Perhaps 
most notably, Jiang’s “winning local wars under conditions of informatization” (在信息
                                                          
2 China’s leadership refers to these objectives in the context of “Comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli—综合国力). This was 
noted in a report to US Congress made annually that comprehensively examines China’s internal and external security environments 
and military development. See, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China  2011,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 6, 2011, 9-10, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf   
3 While Hu took over as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) in November 2002 
and as President of China in March 2003, Jiang remained Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) until late 2004, and as 
such presumably had considerable influence on Chinese military policy during almost half of the last decade. 
4 For a comprehensive analysis of China’s contemporary security challenges separated into “internal” and “external” threats, see 
Yang, J. “China’s Security Challenges: Priorities and Policy Implications”, Asia Pacific Countries’ Security Outlook and Its 
Implications for the Defense Sector, Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), 141-159, 142-47, 
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series5/pdf/5-10.pdf 
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化条件下打赢区域战争的能力)5 and Hu’s “diverse military tasks” (多样化军事任务), 
central military policies of the two leaders, both have emphasized that China will face 
unprecedented security threats in the 21
st
 century.
6
 The development of a blue water 
navy, a modern air force, streamlined ground forces, first-class missile systems, and 
advanced cyber-warfare and space programs reflect the PLA’s comprehensive 
development towards a military capable of addressing twenty-first century challenges. 
As China’s military modernization unfolds, many experts place a growing focus 
on international PLA developments, including the PLA’s growing portfolio of 
international non-combat operations (非战争军事行动).7 These include missions such as 
peacekeeping, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and evacuation of Chinese citizens 
in emergency situations overseas. In recent years the PLA has attached great importance 
to international non-combat missions throughout the world, including in Southeast Asia, 
Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Not only do these missions provide platforms 
for improving PLA operational capabilities, but they also help improve China’s bilateral 
relations and international image as a responsible stakeholder.
8
 For example, the 
                                                          
5 This phrase is the descendant of the 1993 term “Local wars under modern high-tech conditions,” unveiled in 2002 when Jiang 
released a set of “Military Strategic Guidelines” which stated that future wars would likely be “high-tech” compared to China’s 
historical war fighting experiences. With respect to the terminology adjustment, PLA Scholar David Finkelstein notes, “That change, 
however, was basically a variation on the same theme. The important point to make is that the PLA was charged in 1993 to cease 
focusing its modernization efforts on late industrial age warfare and shift to a long term program of developing the necessary 
capabilities for fighting late 20th-century and early 21st-century conventional warfare as exemplified by U.S. forces in 1991.” David 
Finkelstein, “China's National Military Strategy: An Overview of the "Military Strategic Guidelines," Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 
2007, 104-111. 
6“Annual Report to Congress,” 1; James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and the Pla’s ‘New Historic Missions’,” China Leadership 
Monitor, Volume 27, 7, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM27JM.pdf 
7 Much available English literature places non-combat operations in the context of implications for China’s soft power and 
operational experience. See, for example, Cynthia Watson, “The Chinese Armed Forces and Non-Traditional Missions: A Growing 
Tool of Statecraft,” China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 4, February 20, 2009, 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34532&cHash=b1466b4c24; Bates Gill and Chin-hao 
Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implications,” SIPRI Policy Paper no. 25, November 2009, 
http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP25.pdf ; Drew Thompson, “International Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance: A 
Future Role for the PLA?,” China Brief Volume: 8 Issue: 11, June 6, 2008, 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4941&tx_ttnews[backPid]=168&no_cache=1;  
 Tania M. Chacho, “Lending a Helping Hand: The People’s Liberation Army and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief,” 2009, 
http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/Research%20Papers/2009/LENDING%20A%20HELPING%20HAND%20THE%20PEOPLES%20LIB
ERATION%20ARMY%20AND%20HUMANITARIAN%20ASSISTANCE%20DISASTER%20RELIEF.pdf  
8 Drew Thompson, “China’s army looks beyond its shores,” Asia Times Online, May 29, 2008, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JE29Ad01.html; Many Chinese scholars have noted the positive effects of non-combat 
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People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has gained historic operational far seas 
experience through its anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden as well as from its 
evacuation of 30,000 Chinese citizens from Libya during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, 
an operation that also allowed the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) to carry 
out its first overseas operational deployment.
9
  
While operational gains and soft power are important to Chinese and Western 
observers alike, they often overshadow the reality that China’s non-combat operations are 
fundamentally domestic in terms of both objective and scope. Somewhat paradoxically, 
non-combat operations are typically the face of the PLA’s burgeoning international 
presence, such as the PLAN’s anti-piracy escort task forces in the Gulf of Aden and the 
PLA’s peacekeeping troops participating in African UN peacekeeping missions.10 Yet, 
as this paper argues, the core objectives and most significant gains of non-combat 
operations are the stability they provide to China’s internal security environment. In fact, 
amid growing speculation among international observers that China is poised to boost its 
military influence throughout the world, a claim supported by consistent double-digit 
growth of China’s military expenditures, many often neglect the reality that domestic 
non-combat operations are expanding the domestic role of the armed forces in China as 
well as the proportion of China’s military budget that is spent domestically. China’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
operations on the PLA’s image. See, for example, Liu Mingxue[刘明学]，“在重大非战争军事行动报道中彰显人民军队形象，” 
[Zai zhongda feizhanzheng junshi xingdong baodaozhong zhangxian renmin jundui xingxiang] [Display the image of a people’s army 
amid the reporting of major non-combat operations], 中国军网 [Zhongguo junwang][China Military Online], May 4, 2011, 
http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/51757/45802/194788/208832/14550344.html 
9 Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “The PLA Air Force’s First Overseas Operational Deployment: Analysis of China’s decision to 
deploy IL-76 transport aircraft to Libya,” China SignPost™ 洞察中国, March 1, 2011, http://www.chinasignpost.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/China-SignPost_27_Analysis-of-PLAAF-IL-76-deployment-to-Libya_201103011.pdf  
10 For example, see Michael S. Chase and Kristen Gunness, “The PLA’s Multiple Military Tasks: Prioritizing Combat Operations and 
Developing MOOTW Capabilities,” China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, Volume: 10 Issue: 2, January 21, 2010, 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35931&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=8945e05997   
. Much of the available scholarship on China’s non-combat operations focuses on China’s cooperation (or lack thereof) with other 
states as well as gains in operational experience and capabilities from international operations. Notable examples include PLA 
peacekeeping operations in Africa, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden, People’s 
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) evacuations of Chinese citizens in Libya during the Arab Spring uprisings, and, more recently, 
joint anti-piracy patrols along the Mekong River in Southeast Asia. 
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domestic security budget has outpaced its military budget since 2010
11
, indicating that 
Beijing has begun channeling substantial resources towards maintaining internal 
stability.
12
 
This paper examines the internal drivers of non-combat activities of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) in the 21
st
 century, with a focus on the military’s role in disaster 
relief and domestic stability maintenance. While there are enormous benefits for China’s 
international economic and military influence from participation in international non-
combat missions, such as improving operational capacity and enhancing international soft 
power, I argue that the PLA’s twenty-first century non-combat missions are chiefly 
designed to achieve domestic goals such as maintaining regime stability in China, 
balancing complex Chinese civil-military relations, and ensuring broad domestic public 
support of the military. I also argue that an “outward-looking” approach focusing 
primarily on international ramifications of non-combat operations is important, but in the 
end insufficient to understand the core nature and objectives of China’s non-combat 
operations. Finally, I argue that when put in historical context and analyzed through 
domestic socioeconomic, civil-military and historical dimensions, it becomes clear that 
China’s twenty-first century non-combat operations as a whole may deter Chinese 
external military development as a growing concentration of attention and resources is 
required for internal operations that have always been and will continue to be a 
stronghold of Chinese political and military legitimacy. 
                                                          
11 China makes a distinction between its “external” military budget and its public security budget. The latter is supposed to 
include “the police, ‘state security,’ PAP, courts and prison system at the national and local levels of government. ”See Dennis Blasko, 
“Politics and the PLA: Securing Social Stability,” China Brief Volume: 12 Issue: 7, March 30, 2012, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39208 
12 National People’s Congress Spokesman Li Zhaoxing revealed in early March that China’s military budget for 2012 is estimated to 
increase by 11.2% to 670.27 billion RMB, or about $106.41 billion. See “李肇星:中国军费预算 2012 年为 6702．74 亿元,” [Li 
Zhaoxing: Zhongguo junfei yusuan 2012nian wei 6702.74 yiyuan][Li Zhaoxing: China’s estimated military budget for 2012 is 
670.274 billion Yuan] 新华网[Xinhuawang][Xinhua News Online], March 4, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012lh/2012-
03/04/c_111600760.htm  
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Specifically, this paper examines two of the most common types of PLA non-
combat operations: disaster relief (抢险救灾) and domestic stability maintenance (维持
稳定). First, disaster relief and domestic stability maintenance together constitute the 
large majority of PLA non-combat operations. Second, both types of operations often 
require the PLA and PAP
13
 to operate in sensitive, high-pressure environments in which 
performance has considerable social, economic and political ramifications. Third, 
analysis of the PLA’s and PAP’s respective roles in disaster relief and domestic stability 
maintenance highlight the sensitivity of non-combat missions to both the military and the 
Party, and provide a valuable look into the PLA’s changing role in Chinese society. 
Finally, these operations provide valuable windows to examine coordination between 
military units and civil government agencies at the national, regional and local level, and 
more broadly, allow us to highlight performance gains as well as existing deficiencies in 
the military’s non-combat operational capabilities. 
 The analysis in this paper relies primarily on existing publicly available English-
language and Chinese-language scholarship on twenty-first century non-combat 
operations, as well as publicly available Chinese-language primary source documents 
such as press releases and official regulations published by the military and central 
government. I analyze China’s domestic non-combat operations since 2000, and as 
mentioned above, focus specifically on disaster relief and domestic stability maintenance. 
While the focus is on contemporary operations, much of my analysis is not directly on 
contemporary operations, but the 20
th
 century developments in Chinese society that have 
shaped them and continue to steer the development of Chinese society.  
                                                          
13 The People’s Armed Police, also referred to as the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) is the CCP’s paramilitary arm that has 
both internal and external security responsibilities, though as this paper will show, its primary duties are managing internal security. 
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In late 2011 China’s military held a symposium specifically on PLA and PAP 
non-combat operations. Attendees included Chinese President and Central Military 
Commission (CMC) Chairman Hu Jintao, CMC Vice Chairman Xi Jinping and  CMC 
Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong. The PLA and PAP were lauded by China’s highest civil 
and military leadership echelons for their non-combat operational achievements to date, 
reflecting the growing centrality of non-combat missions to twenty-first Chinese military 
development.
14
 What does the term “non-combat operations” mean in Chinese society 
and how has it changed over time? What do twenty-first century non-combat operations 
look like? What explains the consistently increasing high levels of importance attached to 
non-combat operations by China’s current leaders? This paper addresses these questions 
systematically, beginning with the historical development of non-combat operation in 
China to their present-day state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 “Hu praises military for non-combat operations,” Xinhua, September 6, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-
09/06/content_13632889.htm; “Chen Bingde urges non-combat operation capacity building,” PLA Daily, September 8, 2011, 
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2011-09/08/content_4670548.htm  
10 
 
Chapter 1: Historical Foundations and Modern Scope of China’s Non-Combat 
Operations 
While non-combat military activities existed throughout the 20
th  
and 21
st
 
centuries in China, the nature and scope of these operations have often fluctuated. 
China’s non-combat operations have gradually evolved from their pre-reform orientation 
towards national economic construction into missions primarily revolving around 
safeguarding national security. Since 2000, a range of formal institutions have been 
established legalizing and clarifying, to a degree, the non-combat role of China’s armed 
forces, whose non-war duties have expanded rapidly in the 21
st
 century. In addition to 
growing levels of institutionalization, evidence that both budgetary resources for internal 
non-combat operations and official media and academic coverage of these activities have 
increased dramatically are indicators that Beijing increasingly views military non-combat 
operations as critical mediums for preserving internal security. The fact that an 
overwhelming proportion of the PLA’s modern non-combat operations are carried out on 
Chinese soil rather than abroad further underscores the growing domestic inclination of 
China’s non-combat operations. 
Historical Foundations of China’s Contemporary Non-Combat Military Operations 
Besides its intervention in the Korean War beginning in late 1950 and a brief 
border clash with Vietnam in 1979, China’s armed forces have generally been disengaged 
from major warfare since 1949, and domestic non-combat operations were featured 
prominently throughout the Mao and Deng eras. A survey of non-combat operations in 
CCP history reveals the various ways in which the Party and army manifested the 
11 
 
traditional concept of an army “serving the people” (为人民服务) throughout the 20th 
century by employing the military in various non-war capacities.  
The PLA traces its official origins to August 1, 1927, when Zhou Enlai and Zhu 
De led revolutionary troops against KMT forces during the Nanchang Uprising. A month 
later, with Zhu and Mao Zedong at the helm, the military arm of the CCP was officially 
named the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (工农红军), the precursor to the modern 
PLA.
15
 Due to bleak economic and political conditions prevailing in China during the 
interwar years, the Red Army immediately shouldered broad production and propaganda 
responsibilities in addition to its war fighting duties, such as agricultural production 
within Communist bases.
16
 This strategy was closely linked to Mao’s belief that military 
victory relied on the ability to mobilize the peasant masses, an approach that originated in 
from Mao’s earlier work in Hunan which was instrumental in laying the foundations of 
the “mass line” (群众路线) in Chinese political and military activities and was reported 
in Mao’s 1927 “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan” (湖南农民运动考察报告). 
Reliance on mass movements became a cornerstone of his “People’s War” (人民战争) 
doctrine during the Chinese Civil War and Second Sino-Japanese War.
17
 Mao tasked the 
Red Army with indoctrinating the masses, organizing the masses and helping the masses 
(宣传群众, 组织群众, 帮助群众), effectively inculcating the military as a political, 
military and economic arm of the Communist Party.
18
  
                                                          
15 “Timeline of People's Liberation Army (PLA) over eight decades,” China Daily, August 1, 2007, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-08/01/content_5446933.htm  
16 James Mulvenon, “Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex,” Bonn International Centre 
for Conversion (BICC), Bonn, Germany, 1999, 20 
17 Arif Dirlik and Maurice J. Meisner, “Marxism and the Chinese experience: issues in contemporary Chinese socialism,” Armonk, 
N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1989, 45 
18 Liu Zhongmin [杨忠民], “杨忠民：人民军队战斗队、工作队、宣传队思想的历史发展与实践,” [Liu Zhongmin: Renmin 
jundui zhandoudui, gongzuodui, xuanchuandui sixiang de lishi fazhan yu shijian][Liu Zhongmin: The historical development and 
12 
 
These “Three Major Tasks” (三大任务) were stressed by Mao at the Gutian 
Conference (古田会议), the first meeting of the CCP following the Nanchang Uprising, 
and later reemphasized during the Zunyi Conference (遵义会议) in 1935.19 After 
returning from the Long March in late 1935, the Red Army resumed its non-war tasks, 
primarily in the form of leading peasant uprisings in the countryside against local tyrants 
and landlords in order to raise money to support peasants and soldiers living in CPC 
bases.
20
 During the Second Sino-Japanese War, abysmal peasant living conditions in the 
countryside, worsened by frequent hostile encounters with KMT and Japanese forces, 
prompted Mao and Zhu to call on the Red Army to act as both a fighting force and 
production force whose responsibility it was to maintain subsistence in communist 
bases.
21
 The 359
th
 brigade (三五九旅) in Nanniwan became an icon for this movement 
within the Red Army, as vivid descriptions of soldiers and Chinese peasants tilling fields 
together as a model of self-sufficiency were promulgated through CCP propaganda 
channels as part of a larger “Nanniwan Spirit” (南泥湾精神).22 The economic 
production efforts of military units during pre-revolutionary China were welcomed by 
CCP leadership, who utilized the military’s non-war activities to brand the Party and 
army as sympathetic to the plight of Chinese peasants throughout the countryside.  
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, the CCP was constantly engaged in 
warfare and relied heavily on peasant assistance in defeating both the Japanese and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
practice of the fighting force, working force and propaganda force thought of the people’s army] 新湘评论杂志社 [Xinxiang pinglun 
zazhishe] [Xinxiang Commentary Magazine], 2010 (9), http://www.xxplzx.com/xxplml/yyyl2007/t20100510_297776.htm     
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21Feng Zhigui [冯芝桂], “朱德和南泥湾大生产运动,” [Zhude he nanniwan dashengchan yundong][Zhu De and the Nanniwan Mass 
Production Movement] 人民政协报 [Renmin zhengxie bao][People’s Political Consultative Daily]，July 12, 2009，
http://epaper.sqdaily.com/sqwb/page/27/2009-07-12/A08/36741247389650675.pdf  
22“Soldiers of Fortune,” 29-30. 
13 
 
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). During the 1920s and 1930s, peasant villages 
functioned as vital sources of local intelligence that allowed the CCP to survive Chiang 
Kai-shek’s encirclement campaigns, as well as the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-
1945). The Party relied heavily on public support both on and off the battlefield. Many 
peasants, weary of KMT corruption and Japanese brutality, conscripted into the ranks of 
the growing PLA, and others sheltered PLA soldiers and provided intelligence to the 
PLA. Mao Zedong’s concept of “People’s War” flourished during this era, and support of 
the masses proved to be the most decisive weapon in the CCP’s arsenal.  
The CCP also relied heavily on peasant support in the countryside to defeat the 
KMT in the Chinese Civil War. In 1946 the CCP Central Committee, recognizing that 
supporting peasant land revolts was the only way to maximize peasant support, issued the 
May Fourth Directive.
23
 The directive ordered CCP officials to fully support land revolts 
in agricultural China, and “Let no poor peasant remain poor, let no backward element 
remain backward, leave no question between the people be unresolved, leave no feudal 
remnants in the people’s thinking, and leave no landlord in possession of his property.”24 
Peasants rallied around common themes of oppression by landlords, and the CCP was a 
medium for collective action. Even after Communist victory, the thoroughness of the 
CCP’s campaigns in rural China is exemplified by PLA’s labeling of landowners as 
“exploiting classes.”25 By the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War, Mao had rebranded 
the PLA as a fighting force, a working force and a production force (战斗队, 宣传队, 
工作队), solidifying the official scope of the military’s non-combat operations.26 The 
                                                          
23 William Hinton, “Fanshen; a documentary of revolution in a Chinese village,” New York, Vintage Books 1966, 202 
24 Ibid., 80-81 
25 Jun Jing, “The Temple of Memories: History, Power and Morality in a Chinese Village,” (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 
1996, 48. 
26 “人民军队战斗队” 
14 
 
multi-tasking nature of the PLA in pre-communist China built a broad foundation for 
further PLA expansion into other non-combat spheres of operation after 1949. 
 
 
Non-Combat Operations in Communist China 
The nature of China’s non-combat activities has fundamentally changed several 
times between 1949 and present day.
27
 PLA Scholar Zhu Zhijiang classifies the historical 
development on PLA non-combat operations into six periods, which are laid out in Figure 
1.  
Figure 1: Evolution of Non-Combat Operations in Communist China
28
 
Period Primary Nature
29
 of Domestic PLA Non-Combat Activities 
1949-1953 Military Control
30
, Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries 
and Bandits, Land Reform 
1954-1965 Building the Countryside, Organizing Industrial and 
Agricultural Production 
1966-1976 Military Control Militarization of Politics and Economic 
Production, Disaster Relief 
                                                          
27 Zhu Zhijiang [朱之江]，“人民军队非战争军事行动述论，” [Renmin jundui feizhanzheng junshi xingdong shulun][Discussion 
of the Non-Combat Operations of the People’s Army], 军事历史研究 [Junshi lishi yanjiu][Military History Research]，2010 (1) 
28 Sources: “人民军队;” Andrew Scobell, “ Seventy-Five Years of Civil-Military Relations: Lessons Learned,” 2003 Strategic 
Studies Institute (SSI), 427-444; George Osborn, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Political Socialization,” Army War 
College, Parameters. Vol. I, Winter 1972. pp. 22-27 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA510005  
29 Of course, the PLA and PAP have participated in a myriad of other non-combat operations throughout different historical eras, such 
as disaster relief, occupation of Special Autonomous Regions (SAR), border control, and international MOOTW, to name a few. This 
chart attempts to capture only the primary form of non-combat operations throughout post-1949 Chinese history. 
30 “Military control” (军管) broadly refers to military units establishing political governance over an area. A prime example of such 
control were the “Revolutionary Committees” informally controlled by the PLA during the Cultural Revolution. See “Seventy-Five 
Years of Civil-Military Relations,” 427-435. 
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1977-1988 Assistance to Construction of National Economy Through 
Agriculture, Industry and Business 
1989-2001 Economic Production, Stability Maintenance, Disaster Relief 
2001-Present Stability Maintenance, Disaster Relief, Counterterrorism, 
Humanitarian Assistance 
 
Between 1949 and 1989, the primary nature of China’s non-combat operations 
can be broadly grouped into socialist state building in the form of economic production 
and political work. In the period immediately following Communist victory, pockets of 
KMT supporters remained throughout the countryside that worked against CCP forces. 
Moreover, many remnants of pre-revolutionary landlord systems had still not been 
eradicated despite large-scale, nationwide campaigns calling for peasants to overthrow 
exploitative proprietors such as the May Fourth movement.
31
 As such, the PLA was 
largely occupied with counterinsurgency operations against KMT loyalists as well as 
completing land reforms during this time.  
With the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953, a relatively stable and peaceful 
China entered a period of socialistic national economy building that spanned the 
catastrophic Great Leap Forward (大跃进).32 Until 1966, the PLA contributed to national 
economic production efforts in both industry and agriculture, largely, according to Zhu, 
because no other organizations were developed or organized enough to do so. Scholar 
George Osborn noted in 1972 that 1953 to 1959 represented a “trough” in the degree of 
                                                          
31 William Hinton, “Fanshen; a documentary of revolution in a Chinese village,” New York, Vintage Books 1966, 202. 
32“人民军队.” 
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political socialization of the PLA, a term he refers to as the general role of the PLA in 
Chinese politics and society, which were a large component of non-combat operations in 
20
th
 century China. This shift was due both to the expansion of the CCP’s civil 
bureaucratic structure as well as the PLA’s post-Korean war focus on professionalization 
and modernization. However, while the PLA’s non-combat role in Chinese society 
declined after the Korean War, the “Red versus Expert struggle”33 reaffirmed the army’s 
status as a multi-tasking military with major sociopolitical responsibilities.
34
 
The PLA’s non-combat role during the Cultural Revolution reached 
unprecedented scale in terms of soldiers used and intensity of operations. Virtually all 
political and economic activities were militarized following the mass purging of civil and 
intellectual leaders and essential collapse of civil society, largely due to the destruction 
brought about by the Red Guards in the late 1960s.
35
 The PLA was paramount in 
maintaining social stability throughout the country. Simultaneously, the “Three Supports 
and Two Armies” (三支两军) campaign ordered the PLA to provide assistance to 
communist Leftists purging the civil government, as well as give support to agricultural 
and industrial production.
36
 As China’s civil infrastructure disintegrated, the PLA began 
overseeing practically all civil and economic affairs in regions throughout the country.
37
 
China’s twenty-first century non-combat operations differ radically from the non-combat 
                                                          
33 “Red vs. Expert” was an ideological debate on whether the PLA should remain a strong sociopolitical force or focus more on 
military professionalism. Mao and Lin Biao, Mao’s eventual Vice Chair, were the major proponents of keeping the army highly 
politicized. Peng Dehuai, a PLA Commander at the time, advocated for modernization of the PLA by detaching it from domestic 
politics. 
34 George Osborn, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Political Socialization,” Army War College, Parameters. Vol. I, 
Winter 1972. pp. 22-27 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA510005  
35 The Red Guards (红卫兵) were groups of Chinese students intensely loyal to Mao that attacked the four “olds” (custom, culture, 
habits and ideas) in Chinese society. Their psychological and physical assaults, mainly on traditional Chinese society as well as people 
who supposedly represented old Chinese society such as students with landowning family backgrounds and intellectuals, was initially 
supported widely by Mao and the central government. Eventually, Beijing began to view the Red Guard movement as a threat to 
internal stability and subsequently ordered the PLA to suppress the movement. 
36 “ Seventy-Five Years of Civil-Military Relations,” 427-444. 
37“人民军队.” 
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activities during the Cultural Revolution, partially a result of the damage done to the 
blurred image of the military in domestic society throughout this period. 
The conclusion of the Cultural Revolution and the start of Deng’s economic 
reforms ushered in a new era of non-combat operations characterized by extensive 
involvement in China’s economic and political realms. From the end of the Cultural 
Revolution to the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, PLA non-combat activities largely 
consisted of more national economic building, this time in the form of private 
enterprising and establishment of PLA business conglomerates. As PLA scholar James 
Mulvenon points out, China’s economy in 1978 was depleted from two disastrous 
decades marked by the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, and wages in China 
were essentially frozen from 1958 to 1978. In order to initiate economic reform, Deng 
eliminated the Maoist framework that allowed the PLA to operate with the loosest of 
budget constraints, slashing the defense budget and encouraging the military to generate 
its own revenue.
38
 The growing decentralization of China’s economy after Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reforms led to immense profit-making and resulted in severe 
corruption within the ranks of PLA economic production enterprises. Mounting 
corruption coupled with the events of June 4, 1989 stained the military’s domestic image 
and prompted the military to fundamentally adjust its domestic non-combat role towards 
one more likely to be welcomed in Chinese society.
39
 
The non-combat activities of China’s armed forces underwent an unprecedented 
structural expansion in the period following the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, 
when PLA and PAP troops open-fired on Chinese student protesters in Beijing. Enforcing 
                                                          
38 “Soldiers of Fortune,” 3-7. 
39 “人民军队.” 
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martial law in Beijing in the summer of 1989 marked a major shift in China’s non-
combat activities, which have since been increasingly focused on directly protecting 
national security rather than managing economic and political affairs in China. In 1993, 
then Chairman Jiang Zemin officially pointed out that PLA economic activities had 
grown too large in scope, facilitating corruptive practices, and were having severely 
negative effects on the operational and ideological development of the PLA as the 
protector of China.
40
 Corruption on the business side of PLA operations decreased 
overall fighting force and leadership capabilities of PLA officials, and, equally alarming, 
directly contradicted the PLA’s traditional ideology which stressed the army’s duty to 
uphold respect for citizens, reflected in guidelines such as the Three Rules of Discipline (
三大纪律) and Eight Points for Attention (八项注意).41 After several years of gradual 
dissolution and phasing, Jiang formally banned PLA private business enterprises in July 
of 1998.
42
 As a result, the military was largely disconnected, at least directly, from 
economic production for the first time in Communist Chinese history. 
The military’s 20th century non-combat activities were an essential platform for 
formalizing and institutionalizing non-combat operations as a core PLA responsibility in 
the years that followed. Indeed, during this era a considerable chunk of PLA operations 
were non-combat in nature, from tilling fields to serving as the CCP’s main propaganda 
channel. The remainder of this chapter examines the institutionalization of, resources 
used for, and media coverage of China’s non-combat operations during the Jiang and Hu 
                                                          
40 “人民军队.” 
41 These doctrinal principles were introduced shortly after the founding of the PLA and were emphasized throughout the Long March 
in the early 1930s. Red Army soldiers’ respectful treatment of peasants in the countryside is credited as an important factor for the 
increase of CCP popular support during the Chinese Civil War and Second Sino-Japanese War. 
42 “Asia’s boardroom brass: Armies are in business all over East Asia. But they are being asked to beat a slow retreat,” Jul 8th 1999, 
The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/323260  
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Jintao administrations in order to demonstrate Beijing’s growing prioritization of 
domestic non-combat operations in the 21
st
 century. 
What Are China’s Twenty-First Century Non-Combat Military Operations? 
Non-combat operations in different forms have expanded rapidly during both the 
Jiang and Hu leadership administrations as a result of unprecedented internal and external 
security challenges in the 21
st
 century. Precise definitions of modern non-combat 
operations vary, however most observers agree that these activities, also known as 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), are responses to the wide array of 
nontraditional security challenges that militaries throughout the world are facing in the 
21
st
 century.
43
  
In 1993 the United States Armed Forces first created the term “Military 
Operations Other Than War,”44 shortly after military officials began to realize that many 
UN peacekeeping missions often involved types of military intervention not directly 
related to actual war.
45
 Non-combat operations differ from war operations in that the 
former are aimed at deterring war and promoting peace and stability, while war refers to 
larger-scale combat objectives designed to protect basic national interests such as 
survival and sovereignty. According to official U.S. military doctrine, such operations 
may include “humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, some nation assistance, foreign 
internal defense, most support to counterdrug operations, arms control, support to US 
                                                          
43 Numerous instances of bilateral and multilateral coordination in non-combat missions by states throughout the world in a variety of 
settings reflect the common belief that states, interdependent and connected to the global economy as never before, are facing non-
traditional threats to their national interests. See, for example, joint anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. “Piracy and armed 
robbery against ships,” International Maritime Organization, 2011, 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Default.aspx  
44 “Military History Operations,” Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 1-20, August 2003, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm1-20.pdf 
45 Hugh Segal, Geopolitical Integrity, Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), 2005, pp 275 
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civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants in a permissive environment, and 
peacekeeping.”46  
Since 2000 the PLA has published its own official definitions of nontraditional 
uses of military force. The PLA’s official definition of non-combat operations is similar 
to that of the United States. In Chinese, the term for MOOTW translates literally to 
“Non-war military operations” (非战争军事行动). This term is potentially misleading 
because there are countless types of activities that militaries carry out not directly related 
to combat. For example, both the work of PLA “literary reporters” who wrote stories of 
battle during the Sino-Japanese Wars and Chinese Civil War, as well as that of modern 
PLA dance troupes, are indeed non-combat military activities.  
This paper discusses Chinese non-combat operations as defined in recent PLA 
official statements, which are essentially new forms of the PLA’s longstanding non-war 
role in Chinese society. China’s 2008 National Defense White Paper referred to “Military 
Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW), and in January 2009 the PLA released a plan 
for “building non-combat military operation ability” (军队非战争军事行动能力建设规
划). These documents laid out six chief forms of non-combat operations: Combating 
terrorism and safeguarding stability (反恐维稳), disaster relief (抢险救灾), safeguarding 
rights and interests (维护权益), security and protection (安保警戒), international 
peacekeeping (国际维和), and international search and rescue (国际救援).47 These 
primary non-combat missions have been reiterated by PLA leadership, notably in General 
                                                          
46 “Military History Operations.”  
47 Wu Tianmin [武天敏] and Han Guoxian [韩国贤], “全军和武警部队 2008年以来遂行非战争军事行动任务综述,” [Quanjun he 
wujing budui 2008nian yilai suixing feizhanzheng junshi xingdong renwu zongshu][Summary of the responsibilities of the entire 
military and armed police force in carrying out non-combat operations since 2008], 解放军报[Jiefangjun bao][PLA Daily]，May 9, 
2011, http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/wy/2011-09/05/content_4672769.htm  
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Xu Caihou’s address at the Center for Strategic International Studies in October 2009.48 
The growing importance attached to these specific non-combat operations has been 
reflected by high degree of legal development witnessed in the past decade. 
Institutionalization of China’s Modern Non-Combat Activities 
Roughly coinciding with the PLA’s highly publicized official exit from private 
commercial activities in1998, a series of regulations (条例) were promulgated that 
partially delineated the function of China’s armed forces with regard to non-combat 
operations, the first such publications in PLA history.
49
 Each of these directives 
emphasize that PLA non-combat operations are an expansion of PLA responsibilities 
indispensible for confronting modern, non-traditional security challenges. Moreover, the 
formalization of Chinese non-combat operations over the last decade has signaled two 
notable shifts: the underlying transition from political- and economic-based non-combat 
activities to operations more directly linked to national security, and the growing official 
prioritization of domestic non-combat operations as core military stratagem by Beijing’s 
twenty-first century leaders.  
As Chairman of the CMC, Jiang Zemin played a paramount role in shifting the 
focus of PLA non-combat operations towards achieving national security objectives. An 
August 2001 document titled “Outline of Military Training and Evaluation” (军事训练与
考核大纲)50 introduced the term “Non-combat operations” for the first time in PLA 
                                                          
48 “Statesmen’s Forum: General Xu Caihou,” Center for Strategic International Studies, Monday, October 26, 2009, 
http://csis.org/event/statesmens-forum-general-xu-caihou  Video available at,  (English: “The routine and constant missions for the 
military are tasks that involve counter-terrorism, disaster relief, peace keeping, protection of rights and interests, international search 
and rescue/international relief, as well as security and protection.”) “养兵千日、用兵千日” http://www.kouyi.org/speech/930.html 
11:00-11:35 for Chinese, 11:36-12:25 
49  Frederic Vellucci, “Recent Trends in PLA Navy Training and Education,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission “The Implications of China’s Naval Modernization for the United States”,  June 11, 2009, 2 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_06_11_wrts/09_06_11_vellucci_statement.pdf  
50 “People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010,” National Air & Space Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 61, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nasic/pla_af_2010.pdf   
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history, and signaled the arrival of a new era for the non-combat operations of China’s 
Armed Forces.
51
 This new era refers to the first time that operations such as disaster 
relief, public security and counterterrorism were legally incorporated into the mission 
statement of the military. One year later in September 2002, the CMC published 
“People’s Liberation Army Military Training Regulations” (中国人民解放军军事训练
条例) that demarcated the scope of military non-combat activities to primarily include 
disaster relief and social stability maintenance, and was also apparently the first time that 
disaster relief procedures were included in PLA training programs, reflecting the PLA’s 
renewed focus on non-combat operations.
52
 These formal directives provided a limited 
degree of clarity and, more importantly, a valuable ideological platform based on 
enhancing the military’s non-war duties for further legalization and specification of non-
combat operations during the Hu administration. 
PLA non-combat operations have flourished during the Hu Administration as a 
key component of his ideological paradigm “Scientific Development” (科学发展观）, a 
military grand strategy that has functionally extended and developed Jiang’s “Winning 
local wars under high-tech conditions” security paradigm.53 Viewed as Hu’s major 
contribution to PLA doctrine, “Scientific Development” ideology stems from Hu’s 
assessment that China’s internal and external security challenges have changed and 
continue to change in nature, and that diverse operations and high levels of technology 
                                                          
51 “解放军将按新的军事训练与考核大纲施训,” [Jiefangjun jiang anxin de junshi xunlian yu kaohe dagang shixun][PLA to follow 
new military training and evaluation outline for initiating training] 新华网 [Xinhuawang][Xinhua News Online], August 10, 2001, 
http://news.sohu.com/21/12/news146191221.shtml  
52 Liu Chunjing[刘春靖], “《中国人民解放军军事训练条例》发布施行,” [《Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi xunlian tiaoli》
fabu shixing][ Regulations on Military Training of the PLA] 新华社 [Xinhuashe][Xinhua News Agency], September 11, 2002, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/16/20020911/820467.html  
53 Dr. Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “ Chapter Six: Transformation and Refinement of Chinese Military Doctrine: Reflection and 
Critique on the PLA’s View,” in James Mulvenon and Andrew Yang, ed., Seeking Truth From Facts: A Retrospective on Chinese 
Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era, RAND Corporation, 2001, 131-140, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF160/CF160.ch6.pdf  
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are needed in order for nations to properly adapt to modern security challenges. 
Following Hu’s New Historic Missions Campaign (新世纪，新阶段我军的历史使命) 
which was announced in 2004, non-combat operations have been increasingly 
institutionalized within the framework of “diversified military tasks,”54 a term introduced 
at the National People’s Congress in 2006. China’s 2006 National Defense White Paper 
further fortified the theoretical foundation of Hu’s diversified tasks campaign by 
accentuating the increasingly daunting diversity of PLA security challenges.
55
 The 
amount of text used to discuss these trends specifically with regards to non-combat 
operations has since increased in both China’s 2008 and 2010 National Defense White 
Papers, indicating the high levels of attention that non-combat operations are receiving in 
the most powerful decision-making circles in China.
56
  
Domestic Non-Combat Operations Growth Indicators: Literature, Budget and 
Geographic Scope 
Rising volumes of media and academic coverage of non-combat operations in the 
21
st
 century further bolster the assertion that non-combat operations are growing in 
importance in the eyes of China’s central leadership. According to a 2011 article by noted 
PLA scholar Taylor Fravel, the number of articles in “PLA Daily (人民日报) explicitly 
mentioning the term “Non-Combat Operations” (非战争军事行动) has skyrocketed since 
2008.  PLA Daily, the PLA’s mouthpiece newspaper, began reporting on non-combat 
operations in the mid-1990s, and annual mentions of non-combat operations have 
                                                          
54 “忠实履行新世纪新阶段我军的历史使命,” [Zhongshi lvxing xinshiji xinjieduan wojun de lishi shiming][Loyally Carry Out the 
Army’s Historical Mission in the New Period of the New Century] 解放军报 [Jiefangjun bao][ PLA Daily], March 15, 2005, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2005-03/15/content_2698194.htm   
55 “China’s National Defense in 2006,” The Information Office of the State Council, December 29, 2006, full text available at 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-12/29/content_486759.htm  
56 China’s National Defense White papers are available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/index.htm  
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averaged well over 200 since 2008 after previously hovering between 0 and 10 per year.
57
 
Of course, an important reason for this spike is the numerous events requiring military 
non-combat intervention such as the Wenchuan Earthquake and snowstorms across 
China, as well as the Beijing Olympics that took place in 2008, a year dubbed by Senior 
Colonel Li Daguang as the PLA’s “Year of the MOOTW.”58 
Considerably less accessible than official publication statistics, public data on 
China’s detailed budgetary allocations for non-combat operations are mostly non-
existent. China reports a military budget annually that many analysts believe to be 
considerably less than actual expenditures.
59
 Regardless of the actual number, the 
growing ratio between domestic security spending and the military budget suggest that a 
growing portion of security resources are being used to address internal issues.
60
 In early 
2012 it was announced that the estimated public security budget would reach an all-time 
high at $112.5b, roughly $5b more than the $106.4b military budget, marking the second 
consecutive year public security has outweighed military spending.
61
 While specific 
budgetary allocations for various PLA and PAP activities are unavailable, it’s discernible 
from official aggregate data that China’s internal security resource burden is swelling, 
particularly since 2008. 
                                                          
57 Taylor Fravel, “Economic Growth, Regime Insecurity, and Military Strategy: Explaining the Rise of Noncombat Operations in 
China,” Asian Security, vol. 7, no. 3, 2011, pp. 177–200, 
http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2011.AS.noncombat.operations.pdf 
58 David Lai, “Chapter One: Introduction,” in Roy Kamphausen et al., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational 
Capabilities of China’s Military (Strategic Studies Institute, June 2010), 21, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB995.pdf:  
59 Andrew Erickson, “Chinese Defense Expenditures: Implications for Naval Modernization,” The Jamestown Foundation, China 
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Securing Social Stability,” China Brief Volume: 12 Issue: 7, March 30, 2012, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39208  
61 Ananth Krishnan, “China boosts security budget to fight ‘local wars’,” The Hindu, March 6, 2012, 
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In addition to increased official publicity and financial resources, data available 
on the geographic scope of PLA non-combat missions has been rapidly expanding during 
the Hu Jintao administration. Most observers are familiar with the PLA’s international 
non-combat operations such as anti-piracy escort task forces off the coast of Somalia and 
the Indian Ocean, emergency evacuation of Chinese citizens in foreign countries, as well 
as the PLA’s role in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). However, as Figure Two 
demonstrates using official data from China’s most recent National Defense White Paper, 
practically all of the Chinese military’s non-combat missions are in fact domestic in 
nature. Indeed, since 1990, over 99% of PLA troops used in non-combat missions have 
been deployed on Chinese soil.
62
 While it can be argued that anti-piracy escorts, foreign 
evacuations of Chinese citizens and UNPKO all have used advanced technology not used 
in domestic operations, the overwhelming ratio of manpower used in domestic and 
international non-combat missions is undeniable. Moreover, as China’s economy 
becomes more dependent on stable international trade, it is not difficult to argue that 
international non-combat operations are increasingly tied to domestic security 
objectives.
63
  
Figure Two: Sample of Modern PLA Non-Combat Activities: Domestic vs. 
International 
                                                          
62 Taylor Fravel, “Why ‘Non-Combat’ PLA Operations Are Vital for China’s Regime Stability,” GlobalAsia, Volume 2, Number 6, 
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Source: China’s National Defense in 2010 White Paper; Taylor Fravel, “Why ‘Non-Combat’ PLA 
Operations Are Vital for China’s Regime Stability” GlobalAsia, Volume 6, Number 2, June 2011, 
http://www.globalasia.org/V6N2_Summer_2011/M_Taylor_Fravel.html  
 
To summarize, the nature of Chinese military non-combat operations has 
gradually evolved towards a national security-centric set of activities. The non-combat 
operations of China’s military are clearly domestically oriented based on available data 
on official media, academic publications, financial resources and statistics on operations. 
Since 2000, the perceived significance of these missions by the Party and PLA has been 
reflected through growth in legal institutions, media coverage and budgetary allocations 
for non-combat operations. The next chapter analyzes socioeconomic, civil-military and 
historical trends in post-reform China that help explain the growth of China’s domestic 
non-combat operations in the 21
st
 century beyond the simple explanation of post-reform 
economic growth. 
 
 
 
                                                          
64 It should further be noted that troop deployments are only one aspect of China’s recent disaster relief efforts. According to China’s 
2010 National Defense White Paper, “In the past two years, the PLA and PAPF have engaged a total of 1.845 million troop 
deployments and 790,000 deployments of vehicles or machines of various types, flown over 181 sorties (including the use of 
helicopters), organized 6.43 million militiamen and reservists, participated in disaster relief operations in cases of floods, earthquakes, 
droughts, typhoons and forest fires, rescued or evacuated a total of 1.742 million people, rush-transported 303,000 tons of goods, 
dredged 3,742 km of waterways, dug 4,443 wells, fortified 728 km of dikes and dams, and delivered 504,000 tons of domestic water.” 
See “China’s National Defense in 2010,” Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, Beijing, March 
2011, full text available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm  
Domestic Disaster Relief  1.845 million
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  2009-2010 
International UN Peacekeeping 17,390  1990-2010 
International Disaster Relief 630  2000-2010 
International Anti-Piracy Missions in Gulf of Aden 6,160  2008-2010 
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Chapter 2: Internal Drivers of PLA Non-Combat Operations in Post-Reform China 
This chapter analyzes post-reform China in three intertwined dimensions to help 
explain the recent surge of domestic non-combat operations discussed in the previous 
chapters. First, systemic socioeconomic tensions resulting from economic reform, such as 
regional and local income inequality and high levels of corruption, have increased 
domestic unrest and as a result have placed heavier domestic security burdens on the PAP 
and PLA. Second, military modernization since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests has 
isolated the army from the people as the military has become more professional, a 
departure from Mao’s traditional multi-tasking People’s Army strategy, prompting 
Beijing to use disaster relief and other non-combat missions as channels for bolstering the 
PLA’s image as a people-centric army, yet again rebranding the tradition of an army 
“serving the people.” Third, the CCP’s historical role reversal and transition to a policing 
enforcer of the status quo has been harmful to founding revolutionary CCP and PLA 
values, further signaling a departure from the founding tradition of the PLA as an army 
“Serving the people” and pressing Beijing to use non-combat missions to reinforce 
traditional Communist and PLA values in an unprecedented national security backdrop. 
The persistence and intensification of these trends are continuously expanding the 
domestic role of the armed forces. 
“Unintended” Socioeconomic Challenges of Post-Reform Economic Growth 
Three decades of economic reform have helped restore China’s status as one of 
the largest, most technologically sophisticated economies in the world, a position it 
28 
 
enjoyed prior to the industrial revolutions in Western Europe and the United States.
65
 
However, the socioeconomic ramifications of China’s remarkable economic 
transformation must not be overlooked, particularly when discussing Chinese military 
development. Economic liberalization has created innumerable outlets for corruption and 
exploitation, and has fueled extreme inequality at both regional and community levels. As 
these patterns intensify, social unrest in China has continuously mounted, and in many 
cases has had negative consequences for popular support of the government. Rising 
social tensions are leading to more protests, and as a result, the military is devoting a 
growing share of its resources to public security and domestic stability maintenance.  
These undesirable ramifications of economic growth are certainly not a 
phenomenon unique to post-reform China. Samuel Huntington posited in 1968 that 
modernization “contributes to corruption by creating new sources of wealth and power, 
the relation of which to politics is undefined by the dominant traditional norms of the 
society and on which the modern norms are not yet accepted by the dominant groups 
within the society.”66 While her historically unparalleled economic boom since 1978 is 
typically extolled by Chinese and Western observers alike, China’s growth has, similar to 
that of many emerging economies in history, created immense potential for domestic 
insecurity. This somewhat counterintuitive phenomenon of growth followed by domestic 
instability has already been documented as a key driver of China’s growing non-combat 
operations by MIT scholar Taylor Fravel, who notes that for China, unintended growth 
consequences in the form of “internal migration, urbanization, income inequality, and 
                                                          
65 Carl Dahlman and Jean-Eric Aubert, “China and the Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21st Century,” World Bank Publications, 
September 2001, xv. 
66 Samuel Huntington, “Political Order in Changing Societies,” Yale University Press, 1968, 61. 
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corruption” all represent potential threats to CCP legitimacy.67 Non-combat operations 
related to domestic unrest, such as social stability maintenance, have major implications 
for the image of the PLA and the legitimacy of the Party. 
 
Perhaps the most frequently cited statistic on post-reform socioeconomic tensions, 
China’s Gini coefficient was reported to be .46 in March 2012, significantly higher than 
its pre-reform level of .302 in 1978.
68
 While relatively low compared to other developing 
countries, this signals a definite increase in overall inequality in China.
69
 Additionally, 
analysts frequently note enormous growth in internal people migration and 
unemployment, as well as China’s recent emphasis on investment-driven growth, as 
sources of vulnerability that could derail China’s national economic growth.70 Besides 
these widely studied topics, local inequality and corruption are fueling social unrest 
throughout China, two interrelated forces that this chapter examines in more detail given 
their nationwide prevalence and persistence throughout the reform era. 
 
Inequality does not simply exist between coastal and rural China, but also persists 
at the local level throughout the country and is fueled by local corruption. Market reforms 
have created enormous opportunities for distortion by local cadres in townships and 
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municipalities throughout China. Vertically decentralizing power from the central 
government to local subordinates has allowed local officials to mobilize their own 
resources through “extrabudgetary” and “self-raised” funds in the form of informal fees. 
Local governments can arbitrarily impose fines and fees, and local leaders are often 
judged by to what extent they can raise local revenue through these channels.
71
  
Post-reform rent-seeking through the use of informal taxes and fees in China is 
not a new phenomenon and has been a severe problem for the CCP since the 1980s. 
Beijing has instituted national anti-corruption campaigns throughout the past thirty years. 
In 1982 the CCP Central Committee (中国共产党中央委员会) publicly acknowledged 
the severity of economic corruption since reforms when it published Cracking Down on 
Serious Criminal Activities in the Economic Arena.
72
 In 1985, The People’s Daily 
newspaper, a mouthpiece of the CCP, published the first major article detailing a high 
profile corruption case.
73
 Many anti-corruption agencies have been set up over the last 
thirty years, and by 1996 there were over 1500 organizations aimed at fighting corruption 
in China.  
But while the central government has poured resources into corruption 
crackdowns, such measures are still unable to penetrate into local agencies where the 
bulk of corruption actually occurs. Beijing’s regulations have become more meticulous, 
but local officials continue to disregard anti-corruption legislation by utilizing traditional 
and informal mediums. This phenomenon has been officially referred to as “Where there 
is an order, there is no implementation; where there is a ban, there is still the prohibited 
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practice” (有令不行、有禁不止). Another colloquial phrase to describe opposition to 
corruption by local officials is “Where there is a policy from higher authorities, there is a 
counter-policy from local authorities” (上有政策, 下有对策). When faced with these 
monitoring campaigns, local leaders often engage in “corruption protectionism,” or the 
process of foiling corruption investigations against their own workers. The utter lack of 
cooperation and, at times, downright resistance to Beijing’s policies reflects the 
underlying incentive misalignment that exists between central and local government in 
China. While the former wants to maintain popular support of the masses, the latter is 
better off by exploiting peasants for personal benefit.
74
 
In recent years land acquisition disputes, another medium of exploitation and 
corruption by local officials, have spread throughout China and intensified social unrest 
as a result.
75
 Like informal taxation, “land grabs” are also a form of local corruption 
brought on by China’s economic reforms, which created enormous incentives for rent-
seeking in the form of forcing peasant sales of farmland in return for meager 
compensation packages. After seizing land, local officials reclassify the land as 
commercial real estate and sell it to developers.
76
 Forced relocation into new housing as 
a result of property confiscation also strokes contempt for local government. A crucial 
caveat to land disputes in China is the growing resentment over the negative implications 
for local communities as a result of environmental degradation from development. Public 
unrest over environmental issues has amplified significantly in the 21
st
 century not only 
in high-polluting urban centers, but also in rural areas where distraught citizens 
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increasingly take matters into their own hands via public petition (上访), public protest 
and strikes. In 2005 environment-related mass incidents increased by over 25%.
77
 
China’s systemic instability issues are aggravated in areas with distinct regional 
and/or demographic features. The most notorious example is that of China’s buffer 
regions in western and northern China. In such areas economic challenges such as local 
corruption are aggravated by ethnic conflicts between Han Chinese, China’s majority 
ethnic group, and ethnic minorities such as Tibetans and Uighurs.
78
 These widely 
covered instances of unrest have been the most violent and largest in scale in recent 
years, highlighting the fact that in addition to nationwide corruption and local governance 
issues, complex regional characteristics compound security challenges in Chinese 
society. 
Post-Tiananmen Military Modernization  
In the context of non-combat operations, Chinese military modernization has also 
had what can be deemed “unintended consequences,” most of which have surfaced 
during the Jiang and Hu administrations and have contributed to a growing rift between 
the army and Chinese society . First, post-Tiananmen military modernization has 
occurred within a civil-military paradigm roughly similar to Samuel Huntington’s 
concept known as “objective control.” In addition to major shifts in civil-military 
relations, the structural modernization of the PLA and consecutive decades of relative 
peace have challenged the traditional image of China’s armed forces by decreasing the 
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degree of interaction between the army and Chinese society as the PLA focuses more on 
sophisticated naval, air force, missile, space and cyber warfare development. As official 
statements and publications show, non-combat operations such as disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance are viewed as critical mediums for filling this gap by rebranding 
the PLA’s image as a multitasking army serving the Chinese people in various capacities 
during the 21
st
 century.  
As Chinese civil-military scholar Nan Li has pointed out, a major reason that the 
PLA ultimately intervened on June 4 was because of Deng Xiaoping’s strong military 
credentials and relationships with high-ranking officers. In the post-Deng era, Chinese 
leaders have been wary of a potentially disastrous loyalty crisis that could arise from a 
future large-scale protest and polarize the Party and the people.
79
 PLA scholars such as 
Andrew Scobell have noted that China’s most recent paramount leaders, Jiang and Hu, 
have been civil technocrats with much less credibility in military circles than their 
predecessors Mao and Deng.
80
 To ensure the PLA’s loyalty to the Party and minimize 
the probability that the PLA will have to choose between the Party and the people, Jiang 
and Hu adopted a civil-military strategy resembling Samuel Huntington’s concept of 
“objective control” which aims to control the army by professionalizing it and confining 
it to specialized military tasks.
81
 In the context of modern Chinese civil-military 
relations, objective control refers to “enhancing civilian governance, thus the CCP’s 
legitimacy to rule, and endorsing programs that confine the PLA to its military-technical 
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and external tasks.”82 It also implies a decrease in China’s traditional, post-reform non-
combat operations heavily rooted in domestic social and political work. Somewhat 
counterintuitively, however, civil-military policies of Jiang and Hu have helped drive the 
growth in 21
st
 century non-combat operations, which are fundamentally different than the 
PLA’s twentieth-century domestic non-combat duties.  
Indeed, objective control has effectively shrunk the traditional non-combat role of 
the PLA by excluding it from both domestic security and economic production 
activities.
83
 The visible manifestation of objective control has been structural military 
specialization. In 1995, the principle of “preparing for local war under high-tech 
conditions” from 1993 was formally instituted into a policy of transforming the 
manpower-based PLA to a technology-based military. Jiang reinforced this shift in 1997 
by introducing “leapfrogging development,” which emphasized the “informatization” of 
the military and converging with more advanced foreign militaries. In 2002, the PLA was 
downsized by 500,000 troops as a result of the shift to technology-intensive development.  
Recent policies and resultant troop reductions reflect the specialization of the 
military that has occurred during both the Jiang and Hu eras. Specialization, Li notes, has 
also erected barriers between the PLA and domestic social issues. PLA ground forces, 
likely the units that would participate in mass incident management, have suffered the 
brunt of cutbacks as technology-intensive sectors such as the People’s Liberation Army 
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Navy (PLAN), People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Second Artillery have 
received major boosts in funding.
84
 As PLA analyst Frank Miller asserts, modernization 
fundamentally changed the PLA’s functional role in society, and “the PLA is not as close 
to the people as it once was and still claims to be.”85 Given the high level of military 
specialization that has occurred in the post-Deng era under Jiang and Hu, the day-to-day 
relationship between PLA soldiers and Chinese society has changed dramatically since 
the late 1990s. And given the intimate historical relationship between PLA soldiers and 
Chinese citizens, it is as such critical that the PLA finds new ways to effectively maintain 
its image as an army for the people in a security environment where China’s military and 
civilians are increasingly estranged. Contemporary non-combat missions such as disaster 
relief and humanitarian assistance are often the only channels for the military to project 
this image, particularly in areas with poor infrastructure and formidable geographic 
terrain, which also happen to be where most of China’s natural disasters occur. 
In addition to objective control policies, a relative lack of external security threats, 
particularly since the Cold War, have aligned the CCP’s and PLA’s incentives for scaling 
up domestic non-combat operations. Since 1979, China has enjoyed relative peace and 
has avoided entanglement in major conflict, and vulnerability to external security threats 
decreased even more following the collapse of the Soviet Union and a general cooling of 
tensions among states worldwide.
86
 While Beijing has confined the PLA to military tasks 
to avoid a loyalty crisis, both CCP and PLA leadership have the incentive to maintain the 
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PLA’s operational capacity in order to safeguard their respective interests. Non-combat 
operations provide excellent opportunities for doing this for many otherwise idle PLA 
units, and as a result, the military has enlarged the scope of its non-combat duties both 
within China and internationally.
87
 Thus in order to maintain capacity despite limited 
external security threats, while also reaffirming the PLA’s image throughout the country, 
twenty-first century non-combat missions have flourished as a convenient intersection of 
CCP and PLA interests. 
Amidst monumental civil-military shifts, a larger role in domestic non-combat 
operations such as disaster relief operations has provided a golden opportunity to fill the 
void between the PLA and the people created over the past twenty years. The PLA’s 
emphasis on creating and maintaining a favorable reputation and image in Chinese 
society, particularly during the post-Tiananmen era, is an important reason why PLA 
disaster relief efforts have been scaled up. Moreover, non-combat operations often 
represent an area where the incentives of China’s civil and military leaders are in line, 
since activities such as disaster relief enhance domestic stability while also allowing the 
PLA and PAP to remain active during times of otherwise idleness.  
Post-Reform Historical Shifts 
Another dimension of PLA non-combat operations involves broader historical 
changes to both the CCP’s and military’s role in Chinese society. The CCP’s military 
arm, the Red Army, amassed widespread support of the Chinese people by liberating 
them from various types of oppression during the first half of the 20
th
 century. Since 
2000, however, the military has frequently been tasked with managing situations of 
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internal disorder, involving both ethnic Han Chinese and Chinese minority groups. 
Traditional PLA principles such as dedication and loyalty to common Chinese people are 
being put into question as a result of the military’s transition towards a policing role in 
China. While the PLA attempts to minimize its operations in this field, preferring to defer 
to the PAP, the negative implications of this historical role reversal are helping drive 
growth in other types of non-combat missions such as disaster relief, where participation 
contributes to the traditional image of the military through on-site operations and the 
accompanying nationwide media campaigns that have been witnessed during recent 
disaster relief operations such as the Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008 and Zhouqu 
mudslides in 2010.
88
 
The relationship between the CCP and Chinese society was forged in an era of 
turbulence and violence. During the period between the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 
and Communist victory in 1949, Chinese citizens endured decades of warlord 
factionalism, civil war, and war against Japanese invaders. During this period, the CCP 
established itself as a revolutionary political party strongly opposed to the feudalistic 
landlord system that persecuted millions of Chinese peasants. They also built up popular 
support by vehemently denouncing intrusion in China by foreign invaders, particularly 
Japan.  
Other than contempt for intrusion by foreign militaries such as Japan, steep taxes 
were primary causes of mass unrest, just as they are in modern agricultural rural China. 
Widespread inequality between landowners and poor peasants fostered exploitative 
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practices such as rent seeking and bribery. As the non-ruling revolutionary political party, 
the CCP did not have to feed entire cities until 1948, and was thus well-positioned to 
appeal to the peasantry by advocating for land reform.
89
 These sentiments transformed 
into immensely powerful social and nationalistic forces that forged an intimate bond 
between the CCP and China’s masses. Whereas the CCP was an ardent supporter of 
peasant revolt against oppressive landlords in pre-revolutionary China and for much of 
the Mao era, today brutal exploitation of peasants by local CCP cadres is viewed as the 
primary ill in rural Chinese society. 
Just as in pre-Communist China, local political systems in place in the post-
reform era are increasingly incapable of protecting the interests of the peasants. This 
reality is the manifestation of the awkward role reversal of the CCP that has taken place 
locally since economic reforms, worsening significantly in the 21
st
 century. Indeed, a role 
reversal has gradually taken shape in China, where local CCP officials increasingly 
exploit lower-class Chinese citizens who lack access to reliable legal systems, rather than 
helping to liberate peasants from oppressive local rulers as Communist revolutionaries 
did against landlords in the 20
th
 century. This “reversal” has a major caveat, however, 
which is that it is only taking place at the local level, as Beijing is emphatic about its 
support for the exploited masses. Unlike in 20
th
 century China, protests against local 
exploitation and corruption have been largely confined to fighting for rights locally rather 
than calling for revolutionary political upheaval. Regardless, the CCP increasingly finds 
itself in an awkward position, particularly as this reversal matures and becomes more 
visible to increasingly capable lower-class citizens, compounded by the reality that 
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Beijing has largely failed in its attempts to control local exploitation and corruption. In 
this light, non-combat operations are viewed as vital for bolstering the Party’s image as a 
government that cares about its citizens and thereby preventing protests from developing 
into challenges to CCP legitimacy. 
Of course, peasant revolts in pre-communist China were revolutionary, organized 
and widespread, unlike those of today which are essentially village- and township- level 
protests. As both military and economic scholars have noted, village-level mass incidents 
in China to this point have been specific, concrete grievances with local officials rather 
calls for broader political change. Further, there has been virtually no connectivity 
between rural and urban protests, reinforcing the above notion that protests are primarily 
locally based.
90
  
Nonetheless, the role reversal of local Party cadres from liberators to enforcers 
presents an undeniable historical paradox. While the CCP was once a medium for peasant 
revolt, today it is constantly attempting to eliminate channels for collective action and 
cooperation among distraught peasants. This has significant consequences for China’s 
armed forces, which are increasingly tasked with suppressing protests by Chinese citizens 
as a result. 
Moreover, while current protests largely target wrongdoings of local officials, 
even the CCP’s most powerful leaders have publicly acknowledged that the worsening of 
post-reform economic trends may indeed prompt protestors to expand their demands and 
aim for broader political reform. This was highlighted during the closing meetings of the 
National People’s Congress in early March 2012, when Vice Premier Wen Jiabao 
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passionately called for immediate, major structural political reforms and openly urged for 
the gradual adoption of direct elections in China at local and regional levels.
91
 Wen’s 
statements, along with those of several other officials in recent months, reflect growing 
concern within Party circles that domestic unrest directed at local officials may evolve 
into broader discontent with China’s political system and thereby harm CCP legitimacy if 
social imbalances are not addressed. While one consequence of this historical shift for 
non-combat operations is the increased role of the military in suppressing Chinese 
citizens, a second outcome is the need for the central government and armed forces to 
reassert their commitment to the Chinese people. 
A trend towards protests calling for political change may already be emerging. 
Some observers have noted that in the past several years, many mass incidents in China 
have seemingly been “anger-venting” in nature and not necessarily organized around a 
specific grievance or legal complaint.
92
  This is especially relevant as the “masses” in 
modern China become more educated and technology-savvy. The advent of widespread 
internet use in rural China in recent years had provided a modern conduit for spreading 
news of social unrest almost instantaneously. Indeed, over 70% of China’s internet users 
have either a high school degree or lower, suggesting not only that young people are one 
of the primary groups of internet users, but also that internet access has diffused rapidly 
in less developed areas throughout China.
93
 As peasant competency of social media 
improves, so does the probability that news of a given mass incidence will reach 
neighboring towns and counties, raising the overall potential for inter-village 
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coordination. This in particular makes effective management of mass incidents much 
more complex. 
Amid repeatedly failed attempts to control corrupt behavior of local officials, non-
combat operations allow Beijing to reinforce its commitment to the Chinese people, 
particularly in the countryside where the majority of both natural disasters and instances 
of unrest originate. Increasing domestic non-combat missions such as disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance are seen as critical operations for maintaining the status quo, 
which is domestic unrest limited to concerns with local government rather than broader 
political change. These missions reinforce the notion that the central government is 
dedicated to the people, especially in rural areas, and especially in regions where PLA 
and PAP forces have been tasked with suppressing civil disorder. 
To sum up, socioeconomic, military and historical changes are intimately 
connected to the domestic non-combat operation boom in twenty-first century China. 
Mounting internal unrest has elevated the domestic stability role of the armed forces, 
primarily in the form of suppressing mass incidents. This trend, coupled with China’s 
military modernization since Tiananmen Square as well as the gradual role reversal of 
local CCP government units, have challenged the Party and army to find new ways to 
show their dedication to Chinese people. Given that the trends discussed within these 
three dimensions all appear to be growing, it is natural to posit that these domestic 
developments will serve as an increasingly heavy anchor for the domestic role of China’s 
armed forces. The following two chapters detail two specific domestic non-combat 
operations, disaster relief and social stability maintenance, in order to provide a deeper 
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and more concrete understanding of two of China’s primary twenty-first century non-
combat operations and demonstrate the resource needs for improving these missions. 
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Chapter 3: The PLA’s and PAP’s Role in Domestic Disaster Relief 
This chapter examines twenty-first century disaster relief operations in China to 
bolster the argument that domestic non-combat operations are growing in importance and 
that significant resources are still needed to enhance the effectiveness of such operations. 
I examine the PLA’s historical role in disaster relief, explore current deficiencies in 
disaster relief operations and expound on the institutional roles of both the PAP and 
PLA
94
 in order to demonstrate that the PLA is concerned with its image as an army 
“serving the people” in modern China. 
Background and Historical Development 
With a large area and diverse geographic features, China is particularly vulnerable 
to natural disasters. It has experienced a myriad of catastrophes since 2000 including 
floods, droughts, fires, landslides, typhoons and earthquakes, all of which have taken the 
lives of Chinese citizens. Three of the world’s ten deadliest natural disasters in the last 
century have occurred on Chinese soil, and five of the ten all-time deadliest disasters in 
recorded history have been in China.
95
 According to China’s 2009 White Paper on 
Natural Disasters, over 70% of Chinese cities and over half of the Chinese population are 
located in regions with high incidences of earthquakes. Two thirds of China’s land is 
vulnerable to flooding, while drought and heavy rains damaged many regions throughout 
China. The white paper asserts that natural disasters have affected 300 million per year 
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on average, while financial costs have risen above 200 billion yuan.
96
As economies 
throughout the world continue to emit greenhouse gases, problems associated with 
climate change may lead to more extreme weather irregularities and result in more 
natural disasters worldwide. Throughout history and for the foreseeable future, natural 
disasters constitute a serious threat to China’s security. 
The high frequency, intense scale and diverse nature of natural disasters in China 
makes national disaster preparation and management particularly difficult. This is 
exacerbated by the trend of natural disasters striking in relatively underdeveloped regions 
with limited transportation and social infrastructure, such as the 2010 earthquake in 
Yushu Country in Qinghai Province and mudslides in the Zhou Country of Gansu 
Province. Such areas, though less densely populated than China’s eastern coastal regions, 
are home to millions of Chinese citizens, including Han Chinese and various ethnic 
minority groups. 
According to official statistics, the PLA has carried out disaster relief operations 
over 420,000 times since 1949. These operations combined have deployed over 20 
million soldiers and 100,000 air flights, and have evacuated over 12 million citizens.
97
 
The PLA assumed primary responsibility for disaster relief efforts in China during the 
time period between Communist victory in 1949 and Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms 
in 1978 despite a lack of legal framework and effective coordination. Without explicit 
doctrine and laws governing the armed forces’ role in emergency situations, disaster 
relief operations were carried out informally and without a central directive spelling out 
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objectives.
98
 This lack of organization undoubtedly hindered national, regional and local 
coordination efforts, and likely undermined operational effectiveness. Despite 
institutional and, disaster relief was still viewed as a core responsibility of the military 
during the Mao era. In the immediate aftermath of the Tangshan earthquake, for example, 
PLA and PAP rescue units were dispatched in mass quantities tasked with "letting the 
people have hope for life and keeping danger of death for oneself."
99
  
The Tangshan Earthquake of 1976, one of the deadliest disasters of the 20th 
century, exemplifies the informal leadership role of the military in domestic disaster 
relief that existed long before disaster relief operations were institutionalized. In the 
summer of 1976, an Earthquake registering a 7.8 magnitude on the Richter scale struck 
Tangshan City in Hebei Province, killing over 240,000 people and leaving over half a 
million homeless. The central government dispatched over 110,000 soldiers from the 
Beijing and Shenyang Military Area Commands to direct relief efforts in the immediate 
aftermath of the earthquake.
100
 Aside from rescuing survivors trapped amid rubble and 
debris, the PLA was also responsible for restoring telecommunication lines between 
Tangshan and Beijing. It took responsibility for clearing highways and major roads in 
order to allow relief supplies, such as food and medicine, to be shipped into Tangshan. 
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) played a crucial role in evacuation efforts, as it transported 
supplies and evacuated citizens with military planes from over twenty different airports 
around the country.
101
 Besides these core operations, the PLA contributed significantly 
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to the longer-term recovery of Tangshan-- soldiers helped build temporary housing, 
directed traffic, rebuilt schools, and engaged in a variety of other longer-term activities. 
Though the effectiveness of the military’s operations was likely subpar, Tangshan shows 
that the PLA and PAP were inherently responsible for taking care of Chinese citizens in 
times of need long before disaster relief laws were formally passed. Tangshan is evidence 
that the multifunctional nature of the military advocated by Mao was persistent 
throughout pre-reform China. 
Disaster Relief Operations in the 21
st
 Century 
From 1990 to 2010 there have been over 100,000 occasions of disaster relief 
operations by the PLA and PAP.
102
 As of 2010, China has eight national-level 
emergency response agencies designed to coordinate reaction and relief efforts for 
various natural disasters.
103
 This national emergency response mechanism is military-
based (以军队力量为主体) and relies primarily on the armed forces for implementation. 
The establishment of this emergency management system was the first of such in CCP 
history.
104
 
During 2009 and 2010 alone, the PLA and PAP combined to dispatch over 1.8 
million troops to participate in domestic disaster relief operations including floods, 
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earthquakes, typhoons, droughts and forest fires. These efforts are said to have evacuated 
nearly 2 million citizens, and have included activities such as transporting over 300,000 
tons of goods, dredging nearly 2,500 miles of waterways, and delivering 500,000 tons of 
water.
105
  
Not only is the scope of China’s armed forces’ activities much larger within 
China than internationally, but the nature of such assistance is also fundamentally 
different than overseas efforts. The PLA, PAP and militia are referred to as a “shock 
force” (袭击力量) for domestic disaster relief. In addition to being the first line of help 
immediately after disasters, however, the military is also committed to longer objectives 
in areas hit by natural disasters. According to China’s 2010 Defense White Paper, the 
military has constructed eight schools and a rehabilitation center in the earthquake-
stricken provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu, reflecting the comprehensive and 
sustained role of the armed forces in disaster relief and recovery.
106
 The larger scope and 
broader nature of domestic disaster relief are further reaffirmed by the myriad of 
legislation that has been published on domestic disaster relief since 2000. As Chinese 
media has frequently pointed out, the PLA’s role in domestic disaster relief is inherently 
different than that of other militaries, such as the United States, in the sense that China 
views disaster relief as a core military duty.
107
 
Institutional Foundations of China’s Twenty-First Century Disaster Relief 
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Conditions in 21
st
 century China have made effective disaster relief operations 
even more critical, and China’s demographic and geographic characteristics have 
enormous implications for the military’s role in disaster relief.108 While post-reform 
China is typically associated with migration from west to east and rapid urbanization, 
urbanization in China is still in its infancy. Less than half of China’s population lives in 
urban areas, and though this proportion is projected to rise to 65% by 2030, it is still 
significantly lower than the U.S. current level of 79%.
109
 Coupled with the fact that all of 
China’s recent natural disasters have been centered in rural areas, this means that disaster 
relief efforts are implemented in underdeveloped regions with relatively limited 
economic infrastructure. The military has access to the most advanced equipment in 
China, including transportation technology that is particularly critical in emergency 
situations. The fact that a relatively high percentage of Chinese people live in formidable 
geographic conditions makes utilization of this technology even more vital. 
Though the military’s implicit responsibility to carry out disaster relief operations 
has not changed since 1949, the institutional framework of such operations has 
perpetually evolved during the 1990s and 2000s, and reflects the importance placed on 
military leadership in modern disaster relief missions by Beijing. Over thirty laws and 
regulations have been issued regarding disaster relief over the last three decades, 
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including the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
110
 In 1990 the State Council and the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) (中央军委) published an edict explicitly calling for the 
army to actively participate in disaster relief.
111
 In 1995 the Central CCP Committee 
promulgated another directive outlining the PLA’s role in disaster relief,112 and two 
years later in 1997, the CMC formally made disaster relief a foundational mission of the 
military for the first time.
113
 Though specific, detailed procedures for executing disaster 
relief were not provided, the various regulations put forth during the 1990s made it clear 
that the military should play a central role in domestic disaster relief management. The 
regulations also set the foundation for stronger legal institutions to be established during 
the following decade. 
As a response to the various regulations that made disaster relief a specific duty of 
the PLA and PAP, the PLA incorporated disaster relief into its training programs for the 
first time in 2002.
114
 In July 2005 the State Council and the CMC released “Regulation 
of Military Participation in Disaster Relief.” This official publication revealed the 
specific duties of the PLA and PAP in carrying out disaster relief operations for the first 
time. This was also the first time that the central government referred to the PLA and 
PAP as “shock brigades” for disaster relief efforts in China. Guidelines for PLA and PAP 
coordination at regional and local levels are other key cmponents of the directive.
115
 In 
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addition to the groundbreaking directive issued in 2005, there are currently several other 
active regulations that direct the armed forces’ role in disaster relief. The Emergency 
Response Law of the People's Republic of China of 2007
116
 discusses plans for 
coordination between the military and local civilian and government units when 
responding to emergency situations. Additionally, the Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters, issued in 2009, 
discusses the military’s responsibilities specifically with regard to Earthquakes occurring 
in China.
117
 Lastly, the above-mentioned white paper on natural disasters broadly 
discusses the role of the PLA, PAP, militia and civilian units in disaster relief response.
118
 
Performance and Existing Deficiencies  
Twenty-first century disaster relief operations have revealed notable shortcomings 
in disaster relief missions with respect to coordination and technology application. First, 
improved professionalism of the PLA as a result of increased specialization has made 
disaster relief coordination between nationally-dispatched PLA units and local 
government agencies especially difficult, as communication channels between the two 
sides are underdeveloped and ineffective. During the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, Li 
identifies coordination problems between PLA units and country, township and village 
government agencies as the primary hindrance to effective implementation at lower 
levels. These two sides do not interact on a regular basis and thus lack institutional 
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coordination mechanisms Poor coordination efforts likely prevented the CCP and PLA 
from saving more lives in the aftermath of Wenchuan, and poor overall civil-military 
coordination is embodied in the calls by military analysts to employ local reservists who 
have relatively strong relations with both PLA units and local government officials.
119
  
Coordination weaknesses between military and civil units are a partial result of 
China’s recent inability to develop a centralized emergency management system. In 2005 
the Office of the State Council created the Emergency Management Office (EMO) in an 
attempt to address inter-agency coordination deficiencies. Its mandate encompasses 
emergency planning, natural disasters, technological accidents, public sanitation issues, 
social security concerns, as well as recovery and reconstruction activities
120
. The National 
Civil Defense (NCD) within the Ministry of National Defense (MND) is the second 
government entity designed to facilitate coordination. However, thus far it appears that 
the EMO and NCD have been unable to resolve the fundamental coordination issues 
between national response agencies, both with each other and with local governments. 
Additionally, the EMO and NCD’s efforts have not addressed coordination issues 
between PLA soldiers who are transported into disaster-stricken regions and local 
officials.
121
 Local leaders rely on the PLA’s supplies and sheer force in managing natural 
disasters, and thus can be easily overruled by the military during on-the-ground decision-
making. But locals possess valuable local knowledge, and thus effective coordination 
between these two actors may be most crucial in achieving effective disaster relief. 
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In addition to inadequate coordination mechanisms, disaster relief efforts in the 
21
st
 century have also demonstrated the considerable inability of the PLA to apply 
combat equipment and technology to domestic disaster relief operations. For example, 
the large majority of PLA troops dispatched to areas in and around Wenchuan were 
trained for conventional warfare operations, and their equipment was essentially useless 
during relief efforts. Most soldiers used light tools such as picks and even their bare 
hands to remove concrete and other debris. This relative lack of equipment and expertise 
transferability probably raised the resource and human costs of the Wenchuan 
Earthquake.
122
 While Beijing has strived to improve the operational capabilities of 
military units responding to domestic emergencies, Wenchuan highlighted several 
persistent deficiencies, reflecting the fact that China’s domestic non-combat operations 
will not only require more resources to expand in scope, but also demand additional 
resources to improve on existing deficiencies. 
Disaster relief operations are sensitive to both the PLA and the CCP for several 
reasons. First, information on these operations is usually highly available, at least when 
compared to foreign policy and domestic unrest cases. Abundant information provides 
measurable indicators for the success or failure of any operation. Second, there are very 
high risks associated with domestic disaster relief operations. Operational failures on the 
part of the PLA can result in the loss of important resources as well as human life within 
a country. Domestic dissatisfaction with disaster relief management can threaten the 
competency of the military, and also the legitimacy of the regime. As such, in addition to 
the growing frequency and intensity of disaster relief operations in China, improving 
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operational quality is also a pressing demand for the PLA and PAP. As the next chapter 
will demonstrate, disaster relief is not the only domestic non-combat activity with 
persistent operational deficiencies demanding more resources.  
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Chapter 4: The Military’s Role in Domestic Stability Maintenance 
This chapter examines domestic stability maintenance, or weiwen (维稳) 
operations to further demonstrate that the significance of China’s domestic non-combat 
operations has mushroomed in the 21
st
 century. Similar to disaster relief, analysis on 
modern domestic stability maintenance missions also reveals that significant resource 
increases are needed to address major operational deficiencies for missions that are 
expanding in terms of both institutional entrenchment as well as operational frequency 
and intensity. 
Background of Weiwen 
The result of mounting domestic unrest throughout China is the increased 
frequency of public protests known as “mass incidents” in the 21st century. Mass 
incidents (群体性事件) refer to “large-scale demonstrations, which have the potential to 
develop into violent stand-offs between crowds of demonstrators and the authorities, or 
violent attacks on government organs, factories, or other property.”123 They can be 
triggered by isolated events including but not limited to land confiscation, poor working 
conditions, rape and murder. Usually they reflect larger social discontent within a city or 
township. “Weiwen” operations are primarily manifested in the form of physically 
deterring and suppressing these instances of protest.
124
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According to official doctrine, mass incidents stem from “contradictions within 
the populace” (人民内部矛盾).125 Frustration with local government, unemployment, 
poor living conditions for migrant workers and income inequality are generally perceived 
as the main causes of mass incidents.
126
 The vagueness of the term “mass incident” 
makes data collection difficult since it allows for idiosyncratic interpretations as to 
whether or not a disturbance qualifies. According to a Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS) researcher, mass incidents increased from 8,709 in 1993 to 87,000 in 
2005.
127
 Further, a Tsinghua University researcher claimed that the annual growth rate of 
mass incidents climbed to over 25% from 1997 to 2004.
128
 By 2010 the number of 
recorded mass incidents had reached 120,000, according to Tsinghua University 
Professor Sun Liping.
129
 Given this sharp increase and the central role of the military in 
domestic stability maintenance, it is clear that domestic stability maintenance operations 
are demanding a growing share of the military’s resources.130 
Role of the Military in Managing Internal Unrest 
As the paramilitary arm of the CCP, the primary responsibility of the People’s 
Armed Police (PAP) (人民武装警察部队) is to maintain domestic stability, whether by 
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providing emergency disaster relief or suppressing mass incidents that local police 
authorities are unable to manage.
131
 The PLA, essentially the “third line of defense,” 
may intervene in domestic stability operations by providing indirect assistance such as 
transportation and logistical support, or even suppressing protests that are especially large 
in scope.
132
 
The PAP has roots in the founding of Communist China in 1949 when it was 
established under a different name within the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Since 
then control of the PAP has shifted back and forth between the MPS and the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA). Major reorganization occurred in 1983, and since then the 
Central Military Commission (CMC) has exercised oversight over the PAP. Following 
the Tiananmen Square riots of 1989, the PLA has been hesitant to entangle itself in 
domestic stability operations, and as a result mass incident management has become a 
nearly exclusive responsibility of the PAP. Only if martial law is declared by the State 
Council, China’s highest-level decision-making body, will the PLA intervene. As of 
2008, the PAP was estimated to have around 700,000 active troops.
133
 Currently, the 
PAP has 14 mobile divisions that report to the CMC and function as front-line “shock 
troops” for handling instances of domestic instability.134 
The respective responsibilities of the PLA and PAP are directly a result of 
objective control civil-military policies pursued in the wake of Tiananmen. A key result 
of post-Tiananmen civil-military strategy has been the bolstered role of the People’s 
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Armed Police (PAP) in managing domestic stability.
135
 Downsizing of the PLA’s ground 
forces has also resulted in many PLA infantry divisions being converted into PAP 
reaction units.
136
 Theoretically, this process essentially shifts manpower-intensive 
military force to the PAP while allowing the PLA to avoid tarnishing its domestic public 
image through participation in potentially violent mass incidents.
137
 PAP resource and 
manpower boosts have been spelled by major increases in budgetary allocations for 
domestic surveillance. In addition to the hundreds of thousands of security cameras 
installed in China’s major cities (As well as in those with high socioeconomic/ethnic 
tensions), surveillance in China’s rural communities is also being enhanced.138 There 
have been indications in recent years that the PLA is still highly sensitive about its 
domestic image, such as reports that PLA vehicles concealed license plates on vehicles 
participating in domestic stability operations in Tibet in 2008 in order to avoid 
detection.
139
  
Outstanding Deficiencies in Twenty-First Century Weiwen 
Severe deficiencies of domestic stability maintenance operations were first 
evident when the PLA intervened in Tiananmen Square, prompting reform of China’s 
internal security structure. More than 20 years later, Twenty-first century operations have 
also revealed considerable shortcomings that threaten the effectiveness of domestic 
stability missions. These include the unequal distribution of PAP forces in China, local 
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information deficiencies, and a lack of a long term solution for dealing with an 
increasingly capable peasant base. 
Though large in aggregate force, PAP units are unevenly distributed across China, 
and are particularly scarce and inexperienced in regions of China where most of China’s 
notable uprisings have occurred.
140
 The primary reason for this is the reorganization of 
the PAP that occurred after 1989. Following the Tiananmen Square protests in which 
PAP units were caught unprepared by student-led demonstrations, urban PAP units were 
expanded, in part by transferring PLA officers into PAP ranks
141
  Each province and 
municipality has its own PAP general detachment with 800-2000 troops that oversee PAP 
operations within the region, but rural areas typically have far fewer soldiers due to the 
focus on wealthy urban and ethnically sensitive regions. Moreover, the fact that most 
detachment commanders receiving promotions are stationed in coastal regions suggests 
that these regions are higher priorities for PAP resource allocation
142
. Tiananmen resulted 
in a PAP reoriented towards urban centers. This reorganization, coupled with large-scale 
ethnic unrest in China’s border regions in recent years, suggests that the PAP focus on 
central and rural China will be limited despite increasing unrest in these regions. 
In addition to resource limitations, the PAP also faces severe informational 
deficiencies when handling mass incidents in China. Regional PAP provincial 
detachments rely on local village reports to assess whether or not to deploy PAP troops to 
dispel mass incidents. However, local police officers are often extremely hesitant to 
report the true severity of social uprisings, since the spread of social unrest may be seen 
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as a failure of their agency.
143
 Moreover, while the PLA is funded solely by the central 
government, the PAP relies considerably on local funding. It has been estimated that 
approximately 15% of total PAP funding is provided by local authorities at the city and 
township level
144
. PAP units can often be persuaded into distorting information that flows 
vertically toward provincial detachments and the PAP central headquarters in Beijing. 
This behavior is particularly prevalent in relatively poor agricultural and rural areas 
where regulation is limited because of funding.
145
 
Another challenge is that while post-reform mass incidents in agricultural rural 
China have generally been confined to the villages in which they arise, the peasantry in 
this area is increasingly capable and well-educated. The advent of widespread internet 
use in rural China in recent years had provided a modern conduit for spreading news of 
social unrest. Indeed, over 70% of China’s internet users have either a high school degree 
or lower, suggesting not only that young people are one of the primary groups of internet 
users, but also that internet access has diffused rapidly in less developed areas.
146
 As 
peasant competency of social media improves, so does the probability that news of a 
given mass incidence will reach neighboring towns and counties, raising the overall 
potential for inter-village coordination. Additionally, while the PAP has used media 
suppression to eliminate the possibility of coordination in regions such as Xinjiang and 
Tibet, doing so requires action by higher levels of government. Again, many local 
officials, as well as local PAP units, see requests for assistance from higher levels of 
                                                          
143 Kevin Larkin, “On a Silk Thread – ‘Mass Incidents’ and Social Stability in China,” Worldanalysis.net, Thursday, May 13, 2010, 
Vol. II, Issue 7,  http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=1370. 
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145 Ibid., 527. 
146 Tong Yanqi and Lei Shaohua, “Creating Public Opinion Pressure in China: Large-Scale Internet Protest,” EAI Background Brief 
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government as an admission of failure and a loss of face.
147
 As such, PAP units may end 
up being forced to handle mass incidents beyond their capacity. 
Given the increase of mass incidents in agricultural rural China, the military’s role 
in this region is expanding, but not necessarily with adequate resources or information. 
Besides this, more capable peasants raise the stakes and make mass incident management 
even more challenging.  
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Concluding Thoughts 
In the context of a rising China, it is natural to focus attention to the Chinese 
military’s activities beyond China’s borders and overlook domestic operations in the 
process. However, an accurate and complete analysis of China’s military development 
should take both domestic and international operations into account. China’s 
development ceiling is determined by the extent to which it can uphold domestic stability. 
If domestic unrest increases, so does the amount of resources needed to attend to issues 
within China. In recent years thousands of mass incidents across China has been a sharp 
reminder that Beijing is still struggling with the decentralization of economic and 
political power, a process that has been the Achilles heel for previous regimes in China. 
The high frequency of natural disasters in twenty-first century China has also highlighted 
the fact that China relies on the military for virtually all internal security challenges, 
whether they are caused by collective human action or forces of nature. 
Non-combat missions such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance are 
viewed by officials as important pillars for reinforcing the image of a military committed 
to the well-being of Chinese citizens. On the other hand, internal stability operations 
carried out related to domestic security may have very different ramifications on Chinese 
public opinions of the military. Such policing activities carried out by the Chinese 
military can have potentially harmful effects on the relationship between Chinese citizens 
and the PLA, and consequentially can deteriorate domestic popular support for the PLA 
and ultimately the CCP. As a result more domestic non-combat military assistance is 
needed to rebuild the damages caused by these policing activities. 
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Stanislav Andreski wrote in 1968 about the “Peaceful Disposition” of military 
dictatorships, and noted how throughout history there has existed a simple dilemma for 
all militaries: The more time and resources used on internal affairs, the less time and 
resources will be available for external pursuits, and vice versa.
148
 He also posited that 
armies supported heavily by the mass citizenry will fight better, while those militaries 
who are employed as “engines of coercion” will weaken their wartime capabilities. While 
domestic PLA and PAP disaster relief and humanitarian assistance missions are 
welcomed by Chinese society, domestic stability maintenance operations by nature 
possess a strong coercive element, as they involve directly suppressing the activities of 
Chinese citizens. Whether Andreski’s assertions on internal and external military activity 
will hold true in twenty-first century China is unknown. However, China’s leadership 
appears to be keenly aware of the risks of relying on the military to suppress domestic 
unrest, evident from policy shifts after Tiananmen Square. Ironically, China’s leaders 
have employed other forms of non-combat military missions such as disaster relief in part 
to help assuage tensions stemming from the military’s growing role as a suppressor of 
popular revolt.
149
 
Of course, socioeconomic change in the 21
st
 century is only part of the story of 
the rise of China’s domestic non-combat operations. In addition, unmistakable civil-
military shifts resulting in decreased economic and political roles for the military, as well 
as the government’s uncomfortable role reversal in local Chinese communities 
                                                          
148 Stanislav Andreski, “On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 3, Issue 3, 
1980, 3-4.  
149 As noted in this paper, this is not the only reason why Beijing is eager to employ the PLA and PAP in domestic disaster relief and 
other non-combat missions that help enhance the Party’s and army’ domestic image. There are also practical reasons related to China’s 
status as a developing country. 
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manifested through local official corruption combine to beg the question—what role will 
the military play in twenty-first century Chinese society?  
China’s adoption of what resemble “objective control” civil-military policies in 
the 21
st
 century, essentially confining the PLA to technical military development, is 
unprecedented in Chinese history to the extent that it has gained consensus support of 
China’s top leadership. However, the concept of reducing the military’s domestic non-
combat role, at least in the form of social and political work, is of course not a new theme 
in Chinese society. After the Korean War, a large contingency of civil and military 
leaders, most notably Peng Dehuai, hoped to professionalize and modernize China’s 
military, thereby precluding many economic and civil activities from the scope of 
military doctrine. Throughout the “Red versus Expert” (红专辩论) ideological struggle in 
the 1950s, this group believed that “Expert” was indeed better than “Red.”150  
Ultimately, this faction was unsuccessful. In the decade that followed, the PLA’s 
non-combat role, then consisting mainly of domestic economic and political work, 
reached an all-time high in what is considered one of the most disastrous periods in 
Chinese history—the Cultural Revolution. Andreski remarked in 1968, “Being primarily 
organized for defending the country, the army is seldom a good tool for ruling it, let alone 
reforming it.” Andreski’s observation stands out as a lesson learned for CCP and PLA 
leaders who continue to govern China in the 21st century, whose recognition of the 
inherent risks associated with domestic politicization of the military are embodied 
through the adoption of policies that perceivably fall into Huntington’s “objective control 
paradigm.”  
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It may seem counterintuitive, then, that domestic non-combat operations have 
evolved into a cornerstone of PLA and PAP strategy since the start of the 21
st
 century, 
given that China’s leadership has worked to reduce the domestic economic and political 
non-combat role of China’s armed forces. However, China’s twenty-first century non-
combat operations are fundamentally different than the primary forms of non-combat 
duties of the PLA in the 20
th
 century. Earlier non-combat activities in the Mao and Deng 
eras occurred under the ideological framework of “Red is better than expert,” the notion 
that the army, an engine of socialistic indoctrination, could be employed to perform a 
variety of social and political tasks regardless of its skill and experience in those areas.  
Moreover, in pre-reform Communist China, the reality was that China had few 
external economic and security interests relative to contemporary China.
151
 The 
prevailing external security environment combined with a lack of domestic economic and 
social institutions in 20
th
-century Communist China necessitated an active role for the 
continental, manpower-intensive PLA in Chinese society. In stark contrast, the rapidly 
growing non-combat operations of China’s twenty-first century military are carried out 
under a novel civil-military framework shaped by Jiang and Hu that seeks to limit the 
military to specialized military tasks. In this sense, China’s contemporary leadership has 
redefined the domestic role of the military in historical perspective, actively pursuing 
military professionalization policies without excluding the military from operating in 
Chinese society. 
                                                          
151 This is not to downplay the effect of the Cold War on Mao and other CCP leaders. Rather, the argument is that China has become 
more interdependent on its external security environment since economic reforms, especially given how heavily the CCP relies on 
stable economic growth for regime stability. 
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Indeed, it is inherently paradoxical that domestic non-combat operations are 
expanding so quickly during an era of military modernization designed around separating 
the army from domestic social and civil affairs, but certainly not illogical. While the PLA 
is rapidly evolving into a comprehensive regional military power that many would argue 
is set to become a global power,
152
 the fact remains that China is still a developing 
country dealing with severe growing pains that often times only its armed forces can 
alleviate. Beijing is still totally reliant on the armed forces to preserve domestic stability, 
whether it be through dispelling protestors or rescuing earthquake victims. Chinese 
people rely almost exclusively on the PLA and PAP to provide vital support in times of 
urgent need, such as during natural disasters. China’s armed forces also have a vested 
interest in enhancing their role in Chinese society. The PLA and PAP procure substantial 
funding, gain otherwise unavailable operational experience, and repatch their domestic 
image, an issue obviously sensitive to PLA leadership,
153
 by participating in domestic 
non-combat operations. The set of socioeconomic, civil-military and historical patterns 
unfolding in contemporary China, coupled with China’s status a developing state, makes 
it plausible to envision a continuously expanding domestic role of China’s armed forces 
for the foreseeable future. 
The perplexing role of the military in twenty-first century China is a marriage of 
interests of various actors in Chinese society. While today’s non-combat operations are 
fundamentally distinct from those of Mao, PLA scholars, including some cited in this 
paper, have established links between traditional and twenty-first century operations so as 
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to extend the tradition of an army “serving the people” into a new historical era.154 The 
logic behind this association is straightforward—the ability of the traditional Red Army 
to rally the masses in the Chinese countryside is due in no small part to the various non-
combat missions carried out at the time, such as land reform, agricultural production and 
political campaigns calling for Japan’s exit from China. Making a connection to 
operations in pre-revolutionary era inextricably ties the PLA’s twenty-first century 
domestic operations to the traditional principles of the Red Army, and bolsters Army and 
Party legitimacy by recasting the modern identity of the PLA in a revolutionary light. 
In this way, it is conceivable to posit that China’s domestic stability will continue 
to rank high on the military’s agenda for the foreseeable future, despite the conception 
that the direction of China’s military development is primarily outward. This claim is 
considerably bolstered when one examines China’s domestic non-combat operations in 
the context of rising social tensions among citizens across China, an army physically 
drifting apart from its citizens, and a Party unable to eliminate “bad eggs” at the local 
level throughout the country. The end result is more military resources being spent in 
China. While news of international PLA expansion is trending in media spheres 
throughout the world, knowledge of the domestic forces driving these operations and how 
twenty-first century non-combat operations fit into the historical development of an army 
“for the people” are indispensible for understanding China’s present day non-combat 
missions and making claims about their consequences for broader PLA development. 
 
                                                          
154 Western PLA analysts have focused less on this connection not because of a lack of awareness, but simply because their research 
objectives have presumably been focused on assessing PLA and PAP operational capabilities from experience in various domestic and 
international non-combat missions. 
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